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In insurgency situations, the government-organized force is confronted by a small guerrilla group that is dispersed in the
general population with no or a very small signature. Effective counterinsurgency operations require good intelligence.
Absent intelligence, not only might the insurgents escape unharmed and continue their violent actions, but collateral damage
caused to the general population from poor targeting may generate adverse response against the government and create
popular support for the insurgents, which may result in higher recruitment to the insurgency. We model the dynamic relations
among intelligence, collateral casualties in the population, attrition, recruitment to the insurgency, and reinforcement to the
government force. Even under best-case assumptions, we show that the government cannot totally eradicate the insurgency
by force. The best it can do is contain it at a certain fixed level.
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Area of review : Military and Homeland Security.
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1. Introduction
In many recent military conflicts (e.g., Northern Ireland,
Tuck 2007; Colombia, Phillips 2003; Afghanistan, Barno
2007; and Iraq, Hoffman 2004), government forces have
been confronted by relatively small insurgency groups dif-
fused in the general population. In terms of physical net
assessment, insurgents are no match to a government force
that is typically an order of magnitude larger than the insur-
gents (as of 2007 there are more than 500,000 Coalition and
Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq, whereas the estimate for the
number of insurgents ranges between 15,000 and 70,000;
O’Hanlon and Cambell 2007). Also, the government force
is usually better equipped and trained than the insurgents.
The key advantage of the insurgents is their elusiveness and
invisibility; the government troops have the military means
and capabilities to effectively engage the insurgency tar-
gets, but they have difficulties finding them. Thus, although
intelligence is a key component in any conflict situation,
it is critical in counterinsurgency operations. Absent intel-
ligence, not only might the guerrillas be able to continue
their insurgency actions, but collateral damage caused to
the general population from poor targeting by the govern-
ment forces may generate an adverse response against the
government, thus creating popular support for the insur-
gents. This popular support translates into new cadres of
recruits to the insurgency (Lynn 2005, Hammes 2006).
Eliminating the insurgency is the main goal of the regime.
The July 12, 2007 White House report to Congress entitled
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report (U.S. Congress 2007,
p. 4) states:
We presently assess that degrading al Qaida in Iraq net-
works in these critical areas—together with efforts to degrade
Iranian-backed Shi’a extremist networks—is a core U.S.
national security interest and essential for Iraq’s longer-term
stability.
We develop a dynamic model that describes the effect
of key parameters on the outcome of an insurgency: Force
sizes (government and insurgency), attrition rates, recruit-
ment (to the insurgency) rate, reinforcement (to the gov-
ernment) rate, and most of all—intelligence. We consider a
scenario where the government confronts a single homoge-
neous insurgency. Our model and analysis represent a best-
case situation from the government perspective because
(a) the government force is steadily reinforced by new units,
(b) it has unlimited endurance—it surrenders to the insur-
gents only when it is totally annihilated, and (c) the only
recruitment to the insurgency is due to collateral casualties
in the general population that generate resentment to the
government, and therefore more recruits to the insurgency.
In our model there is no ongoing “ideological” recruitment
to the insurgency. Although the assumptions above lead to
a best-case situation for the government, one could argue
that it is not the best case; if the insurgents have limited
endurance and they deliberately attack the population, and
thus undermine their popular support, the situation would be
even better for the government. However, one would expect
that the endurance of insurgents, who are motivated by ide-
ology and zeal, would be at least as high as that of the
government. Moreover, the insurgents, who grow from the
population, would know if coercive actions enhance recruit-
ment or hinder it; they will not act deliberately against
their own interests. Either violent coercive actions by the
insurgents against the population increase their support and
recruitment, in which case our assumptions are still best
578
Kress and Szechtman: Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations
Operations Research 57(3), pp. 578–585, © 2009 INFORMS 579
case because in our model we do not account for those extra
insurgency cadres, or such attacks are mostly a result of
interinsurgency feuds (e.g., Shiite against Sunni in Iraq.),
which is not exactly the scenario studied in this paper.
As far as we know, this is the first attempt to model the
effect of intelligence in a dynamic combat setting in gen-
eral, and counterinsurgency in particular. The closest rele-
vant work is the dynamic guerrilla warfare model introduced
by Deitchman (1962) and followed by Schaffer (1968).
Both papers are based on classical Lanchester equations
(Lanchester 1916). Another body of relevant research stud-
ies dynamic models that describe the proliferation of fanatic
ideas and terrorism (Castillo-Chavez and Song 2003, Udwa-
dia et al. 2006). The relationship between inaccurate govern-
ment fire and insurgency recruiting is discussed in Jacobson
and Kaplan (2007), Kaplan et al. (2005), and Caulkins et al.
(2006). Our model, which combines intelligence, attrition,
and popular support, manifested in recruits to the insur-
gency, sheds new light on the dynamics of counterinsur-
gency operations, and it shows why it is almost impossible
to eradicate insurgency by force only—“soft” actions such
as civil support and psychological operations, that affect the
attitude of the population, may be needed too. This con-
clusion is quite general and robust; it does not depend on
the specific parameters of a particular insurgency situation,
but on general assumptions regarding their characteristics.
Many of these parameters, like attrition rates to government
forces, intelligence levels and recruitment rates to the insur-
gency, are typically classified or unavailable.
2. Model
There are two explicit players in our model—the insur-
gents and the government force that fight each other—and
one implicit player—the general population that sustains
collateral casualties by the government’s actions and pro-
vides new recruits to the insurgency. The combat situation is
asymmetric; although the insurgents have perfect situational
awareness regarding the government forces, the insurgents
are mixed in the general population, and thus their signa-
ture as targets is inversely related to the size of the popula-
tion in which they are imbedded. It follows that the effec-
tiveness of the government not only depends on its force
size and its effectiveness, but also on the insurgents’ signa-
ture. Moreover, for a given level of combat intensity exerted
by the government forces, smaller signature of the insur-
gency results in higher collateral damage—killing innocent
bystanders—with an adverse effect to the government and
favorable effect to the insurgency.
LetG, I , and P denote the sizes of the government forces,
the insurgency, and the general population, respectively.
Although G and I may vary over time, we assume that the
size of the general population remains constant throughout.
Absent any intelligence, the signature of the insurgency is
measured by the ratio I/P , which may be interpreted as the
probability that a randomly selected target is an insurgent.
Following Deitchman (1962), the Lanchester model (Lanch-






where  and  are the attrition coefficients, which should
be interpreted as the general intensity and effectiveness of
insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, respectively.
Let  ∈ 	01
 denote the level of intelligence, which may
be interpreted as the fraction of intelligence reports that cor-
rectly identify the location of insurgents. A fraction 1−
of these reports are erroneous to the point that the intel-
ligence provided is completely useless; in these instances
the government practically “shoots in the dark.” However,
the government force does not know a priori which report
is which, and therefore it engages all targets with uniform







With perfect intelligence ( = 1), we obtain the classical
Lanchester’s Square Law of aimed fire (Lanchester 1916),
and absent intelligence ( = 0), we obtain Deitchman’s
guerrilla model (Deitchman 1962) in Equation (2). The ini-
tial conditions are G0 and I0, and the terminating conditions
are the force endurance thresholds G and I¯ at which the
government and the insurgents declare defeat, respectively.
We assume that both the government and the insurgency
have unlimited endurance, that is, G= I¯ = 0. Although for
a determined insurgency this may be a reasonable assump-
tion, for the government it clearly represents a best case.
The engagement (insurgency) ends when either threshold is
reached.
It is postulated that the main driver for population behav-
ior in insurgency situations is security (Lynn 2005, Hammes
2006, U.S. Army 2006); the population will align with the
side that is perceived as better protecting it, or is at least
less threatening. We assume no sectarian or coercive vio-
lence, and therefore the insurgents do not deliberately attack
the population; their attack is focused on the government
force. Because the insurgents have perfect situational aware-
ness, they do not harm the general population. On the other
hand, absent perfect intelligence, the government forces
may cause casualties in the population when missing their
insurgency targets. This collateral damage triggers support
to the insurgency, which is manifested in new recruits to
their ranks. Let C denote the insurgency recruitment rate,
where C represents the rate at which collateral casualties are
generated. From Equation (3), it follows that C = G1−
1− I/P. We assume that  is monotone increasing and,
Kress and Szechtman: Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations
580 Operations Research 57(3), pp. 578–585, © 2009 INFORMS















Finally, we assume that there is a steady stream of reinforce-
ment to the government force. Thus, (1) is replaced by
G˙=−I + (5)
The dynamical system under consideration is the set of
Equations in (4) and (5). The dynamics of G and I are illus-
trated in Figure 1.
If the level of intelligence  is constant throughout and
the insurgency recruitment rate C = C is a linear
function, a simple analysis (additional details are provided
in the appendix) shows that if   /1 + , then the
insurgency cannot be eradicated, regardless of the initial
force sizes and attrition rates. If / < P1 − 1 −  ·
1+ −1, then the government loses, and if the opposite
is true, then the government can only control or contain the
insurgency at a constant level P1− 1−1+ −1.
If  > /1+ , then the insurgency wins if I0 > /+
G0− 1− /+ 1− 1+ /P21/2, and
the government wins (eradicates the insurgency) otherwise.










Notes. The insurgency (I , dark grey) causes attrition (grey) to the gov-
ernment (G, medium grey) at a rate I . The rate of reinforcement to
the government is  (dark grey). The government operates with intensity
G where a fraction + 1−I/P of this intensity hits the insurgents
(white), and a fraction 1− 1− I/P inadvertently hits the general
population (light grey). The collateral casualties generate recruits to the
insurgency (black) at rate G1−1− I/P. The number of col-
lateral casualties is very small compared to the size of the population,
and therefore we assume that P remains constant throughout.
Although a constant intelligence level is a reasonable ap-
proximation to reality when the counterinsurgency opera-
tion is in some stable state,  may become negligible if
the number of insurgents is very small (either when the
insurgency gets started, or when it has been weakened and
fragmented into a small number of cells), or when the
government force is weakened to the point that it loses
its intelligence-gathering capabilities. Thus, it is natural to
assume that  = G I is monotone increasing in I and
nondecreasing in G, and that G I→ 0 as either G or I
go to zero. As we discuss in the next section, these assump-
tions imply that the government can, at best, contain the
insurgency—control it at a certain fixed level. The govern-
ment can never totally eradicate the insurgency by force.
However, in some favorable situations, discussed below,
regarding the characteristics of the intelligence and insur-
gency recruitment functions, the containment level can be
very small, leading effectively to insurgency neutralization.
In Equation (4), I˙ = 0 if G + 1 − I/P =
G1−1− I/P. If the functions  and  are con-
tinuously differentiable, based on our previous assumptions
and the implicit function theorem, there is a continuously
differentiable function iG satisfying
−G
(











where we define i0= limG↓0 iG. The function iG sep-
arates the region where the insurgency grows (I˙ > 0) from
the region where the insurgency gets smaller; see Figures 2
and 3. The shape of iG depends on the functions  and ,
but in all cases iG is bounded away from zero for all
G. This property follows from Equation (6) and the bound-
ary conditions of , for if iG = 0 for some G> 0, then
G= 0, in contradiction to the monotonicity of . Thus,
the insurgency can never be totally eradicated physically;
there is always a range of values of I where the insurgency
grows. The operational explanation for this phenomenon
is as follows: When the insurgency is small, the intelli-
gence available to the government is poor, and therefore,
when attempting to attack the insurgents, the government
force inadvertently causes collateral innocent casualties in
the population.These casualties generate popular resentment
toward the government, and eventually new cadres to the
insurgents. The attrition to the insurgency generated by
higher values of G is offset by increased recruitment. If for
some range of C the recruitment to the insurgency acceler-
ates with the number of per-unit-time collateral casualties,
and the growth more than makes up the increase in attrition
of the insurgents, then iG may actually increase, as shown
in Figure 3(b). However, as the collateral casualties increase,
the sensitivity of the population to these casualties neces-
sarily ebbs due to population constraints; that is, ′C,
the derivative of the recruitment function w.r.t. the casualty
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Note. The insurgency wins in the dark-grey region, and the government
contains the insurgency in the light-grey region.
rate C, converges as C grows (e.g., · sigmoid, logarith-
mic, or linear). If, as one would expect, the intelligence
function  levels off as G increases, then iG approaches
a constant level (appendix); see Figures 2 and 3. Under
some extremely favorable conditions for the government,
e.g., when  sharply increases for small values of I , this
constant level of iG may be close to zero, meaning that
the insurgency can be weakened to the point that it becomes
insignificant.
3. Results
For any intelligence and recruitment functions satisfying
the assumptions made in §2, the insurgency-counterinsur-
gency dynamics must fall into one of three scenarios,
labeled Lose, Contain, and Contain/Lose. In Lose, the
intelligence-gathering capabilities of the government are so
poor, the recruitment to the insurgency is so high, or the
government reinforcement rate is so low that for any ini-
tial conditions the insurgency always defeats the govern-





























Note. The insurgency wins in the dark-grey region, and the government
contains the insurgency in the light-grey region.
ment. In Contain, the government reinforcement rate is rel-
atively high, and therefore it can contain the insurgency and
keep it at a constant level that, depending on the intelli-
gence and recruitment functions, may be very low. Lastly,
Lose/Contain is the scenario that, in the authors’ view,
most closely matches reality. In this scenario the govern-
ment can either contain the insurgency or lose, depending
on the model parameters, on the intelligence function , and
on the insurgency recruitment function .
The scenario Lose occurs when iG > / for all
G 0. In this case the insurgency wins regardless of the
initial conditions and the government forces attrition rate.
Consider the three regions labeled A, B, and C in Fig-
ure 2(a). In region A both the government forces and the
insurgency grow over time. In region B the insurgency still
grows and reaches a size large enough to cause severe attri-
tion to the government forces, which ultimately get beaten.
In region C both forces decrease in size. If the insurgency
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force is initially large, it can effectively attack the govern-
ment force. However, the large signature of the insurgency
also enables the government force to effectively combat
the insurgents. In this case the government loses while the
insurgency force weakens. On the other hand, if the insur-
gency force is initially low, the government efforts cause
significant collateral damage, bolstering the insurgency to
the point that the government debilitates and eventually col-
lapses. Therefore, regardless of the insurgents’ initial force
level, when the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the
government grow slowly with the insurgents’ strength, or
the resentment generated by civilian casualties caused by
government actions is not negligible, or the government
reinforcement rate  is too low, the government is bound to
lose, even with very favorable initial force ratios or attrition
coefficients.
The scenario Contain arises if / iG for all G 0.
This case is illustrated in Figure 2(b). Similarly to Lose,
in region A both the government forces and the insurgency
grow over time. In region B the government forces grow and
the insurgency weakens. Because iG is always bounded
away from zero, the engagement reaches a point where the
government controls the insurgency at a certain constant
level. In region C, where both sides decrease in size, two
cases are possible. In the first case the solution crosses into
region B, leading eventually to controlling the insurgency
(light-grey region). In the second case, marked by a dark-
grey region, the insurgency wins. We show in the appendix
that the boundary of the dark-grey region, in which the























As / decreases, the slope of the line determined by
Equation (7) approaches zero, to the point that the dark-
grey region covers the entire area determined by I > /.
Arguably, Contain is not very likely because it pre-
sumes unrealistically high government reinforcement rate.
If C = C for C small, then  i0= P/1+ .
Based on Iraq data (O’Hanlon and Cambell 2007),
P = 27 M, and reasonable estimates for  and  are 0.01
and 10, respectively. These values lead to a lower bound of
270,000 on the rate of reinforcement—more than one-half
the current total government plus coalition forces in Iraq—
for scenario Contain to result.
The scenario Lose/Contain occurs when iG intersects
with I = /. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.
In Figure 3(a), iG is nonincreasing, and in Figure 3(b),
iG is not monotone.
In the case of Figure 3(a), points in regions A or C con-
tained in the dark-grey area lead to region B, where the
insurgency wins. The light-grey area of regions A or C lead
to region D, where the government controls the insurgency.
It is shown in the appendix that the dark-grey area in Fig-








where a21 and a22 are positive constants, and iG
∗= /;
see the appendix for more details.
Concerning the situation of Figure 3(b), the government’s
strength decreases when I > /, and increases when
I < /. When I > iG, the insurgency weakens, whereas
the insurgency gains strength when I < iG. Points in
the light-grey area lead to containment of the insurgency,
whereas points in the dark-grey area cause the insurgency
to win, except for the light-grey ellipsoid, where the points
converge possibly in oscillating manner to the stalemate
point G I =  G/. This oscillating convergence to
a stalemate is due to the exponential recruitment of insur-
gents that results from the killing of innocent victims in
the vicinity of the deadlock point, and is rationalized as
follows: When I is small and G large, poor intelligence
results in many collateral casualties in the population, thus
strengthening I (↑ arrow from region E to region C). Thusly
strengthened, the insurgents generate effective attrition to
the government, makingG decrease (← arrow from C to B).
The increase in I (and thus ) also enables the govern-
ment to target the insurgents more accurately, causing I to
decrease (↓ arrow from B to A). Finally, the reduced number
of insurgents enables the government to regain its strength
(→ arrow from A to E). In the appendix we show that
closed orbits, where G and I oscillate without ever spiral-
ing toward  G/, are not possible—there are only two
feasible outcomes: Either the government loses, or it con-
tains the insurgency. In mathematical parlance, the stalemate
point  G/ in Figure 3(b) is an attractor, and the point
G∗/ is a saddlepoint. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) depict the
transient dynamics of G and I that lead to that point. Figure
4(a) is the phase-plane portrait, whereas Figure 4(b) presents
the transient behavior of the two sides.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
The three scenarios lead to several observations. First, the
government always loses if there is no reinforcement to its
force because the intelligence capabilities of the government
degrade with the attrition of its force, causing many inno-
cent casualties and indirectly strengthening the insurgency,
which eventually takes over.
Second, there may exist more than one stalemate
scenario—one in the decreasing part of iG, and another
in the increasing part of iG; see Figure 3(b). A stale-
mate in the part where iG decreases may necessitate a
large government force. However, it is a safe stalemate for
the government because it is robust; if the reinforcement
Kress and Szechtman: Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations
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Figure 4. Phase-plane portrait of the stalemate point
in (a), and transient dynamics in (b).

































rate is insufficient, it would take longer for a large govern-
ment force to be defeated before the  can be corrected.
In our model the reinforcement rate  is fixed, which leads
to unbounded value of G in a containment scenario. We do
not expect that this situation could occur because once the
insurgency approaches its stable contained level, one of two
things may occur: Either the insurgency, realizing it can-
not grow, settles with the government and the insurgency
situation ends, or the government reduces its reinforcement
rate such that a stalemate situation is reached where G
remains constant too. When the population is very sensitive
to innocent casualties, and as a result the recruitment to the
insurgency accelerates, the government and insurgents may
approach a stalemate in an oscillating manner. The oppo-
site is also true: If there is oscillating convergence toward a
stalemate, the population must be very responsive to unin-
tentional civilian casualties. If the government recruitment
rate  decreases, then the stalemate force levels of both G
and I decrease (see Figure 3(b)), resulting in less violence
and a smaller government force. The downside of a lower
stalemate point is that a smaller government force has a
higher risk of losing if the combat situation changes, or if
the parameters of the insurgency are poorly estimated.
Last, recall that our model represents a best-case situa-
tion from the government perspective. Under the reasonable
assumptions regarding the behavior of the intelligence func-
tion , we conclude that the government cannot completely
eradicate the insurgency by force alone. If the government
can gather significant accurate intelligence when the insur-
gency is very small, it can reduce the insurgency to a small
manageable size. Finally, “soft” actions such as reconstruc-
tion, civil support, and effective propaganda may positively
affect the population support for the government and thus
improve intelligence (increase the value of ) obtained from
human sources. Such actions can only improve the prospects
of defeating the insurgency.
Appendix
This section brings theoretical support to several results
stated without proof in the main body of the paper.
A. The Function iG Levels Off as G Grows
We have i′G = 0 if and only if the marginal increase in




= dGG I+ 1−G II/P
dG





G I+ 1−G II/P)
= (G1−G I1− I/P) (9)




· 1− I/P1+ ′C− 1= 0 (10)
where ′ = d/dC. Therefore, if the left-hand side (LHS)
of Equation (10) converges to zero asG grows, we have that
iG levels off.
Suppose that GG I/G→ 0. If ′C→ 0, Equa-
tion (9) causes I to decrease as G increases. The same
also is true about  for G sufficiently large. Therefore,
the LHS of Equation (10) converges to zero as G grows.
If ′C→  > 0, then Equation (9) becomes G I +
1−G II/P = 1 − G I1 − I/P + oG,
where oG denotes a function hG such that hG/G→ 0
as G→. Therefore, the LHS of Equation (10) converges
to zero as G grows, with  in place of ′C.
B. The Case of Constant  and Linear 
Consider the case where the level of intelligence  is con-
stant throughout and the recruitment function C = C
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is linear. If   /1 + , then iG = P1 − 1 +  ·
1 − −1 for all Gs, and we have three possibilities:
(i) /< P1− 1−1+−1, so that we fall in case
Lose; (ii) / > P1− 1− 1+ −1, which leads
to case Contain; and (iii) /= P1− 1−1+−1
gives rise to a stalemate, where both G and I approach a
constant positive force level. When  > /1 + , a lin-
earization around 0/ produces the Jacobian(
0 −




±((1− 1+ 1−1− //P))1/2
The eigenvector associated with the negative eigenvalue is
V − = 1 v−, where v− = /1− 1+ 1− 
· 1 − //P1/2. Therefore, I wins if I0 > / +
G0/− 1−+1+ 1−/P21/2 in a
vicinity of G I= 0/.
C. Dark-Grey/Light-Grey Region Boundary in
Case Contain
A linearization around 0/ leads to the Jacobian(
0 −
′0− 1+ ′0//P 0
)

where we use the fact that  equals zero along either
axis. Therefore, the eigenvalues are ±′0 − 1 +
′0//P1/2. If //P > ′0/1 + ′0, the
solutions approach 0/ along the direction of the
eigenvector V − = 1 v− associated with the nega-
tive eigenvalue, where v− = /′0 − 1 + ′0
· //P1/2. Therefore, I wins if I −//G> v− in
a neighborhood of 0/, which is Equation (7). More-
over, v− → 0 as //P − ′0/1+ ′0→ 0. Thus,
when //P  ′0/1 + ′0, the insurgents win if
I > / in the vicinity of 0/.
D. Dark-Grey/Light-Grey Region Boundary in
Case Lose/Contain of Figure 3(a)

































Leaving aside the trivial case where G∗/=1, we
have a22<0 and, because i
′G∗<0, a21<0. The eigenval-
ues are a22±a222−4a211/2/2, meaning that G∗/
is a saddlepoint. The eigenvector associated with the neg-
ative eigenvalue is V −=1v−, where v−=−a22+
a222−4a211/2/2. Therefore, in a neighborhood of
G∗/, I wins if GI lie to the left of the line
with slope v− that passes through G∗/. An elemen-
tary algebraic manipulation shows that solutions in this
region satisfy I−//G−G∗>v−, in agreement with
Equation (8).
E. Properties of the Equilibrium Point  G/

in Figure 3(b)





where b21 and b22 are defined like a21 and a22, respec-
tively, with G in place of G∗. We have b22<0, and
b21>0 because i
′ G>0. Therefore, the eigenvalues are
both negative real if b222−4b21>0, and complex with
negative real part otherwise. In either case, the equilib-
rium point  G/ is asymptotically stable. Moreover, the
Dulac function 1−G+1−I/P+G1−·
1−I/P−2 together with the Dulac-Bendixon theorem
(Perko 2001) show that the system G˙=−I+ and I˙=
−G+1−I/P+G1−1−I/P admits no
periodic orbits on R2+. This justifies our assertion that
the only possible outcomes in this scenario are Lose and
Contain.
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